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Robert P. Mosteller & Kenneth S. Broun††

Paul Giannelli’s Scholarship of
Measured Wisdom, Sophistication,
and Significance, and a Man of
Diligence, Humor, and
Graciousness
We had the great fortune to have Paul Giannelli join our evidence
casebook more than fifteen years ago upon the retirement of our coauthor Professor John Strong. Some years later, Paul also became a coauthor of our evidence problem book. In this piece, we make comments,
first regarding Paul as an exceptional evidence scholar as reflected in
his contribution to our evidence casebook, and second regarding Paul
as a wonderful co-author and colleague.

I. Paul Giannelli—Exceptional Evidence Scholar
Paul brought rich insights and detailed knowledge of evidence law
across a broad range of topics to our casebook1 and contributed in many
different ways. As the lead author of the comprehensive, frequentlycited text, Scientific Evidence,2 he was in a unique position to make an
especially strong contribution to our book in the area of expert
testimony and related matters. This Article gives us an opportunity to
stress his enormous impact on the development of the law of expert
evidence and particularly his analysis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3
††

J. Dickson Phillips Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of North
Carolina School of Law; Henry Brandis Professor of Law Emeritus at the
University of North Carolina School of Law.

1.

Kenneth S. Broun, Robert P. Mosteller & Paul C. Giannelli,
Evidence: Cases and Materials (8th ed. 2014).

2.

Paul C. Giannelli et al., Scientific Evidence (5th ed. 2012).

3.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Paul brought an impressive measure of sophistication, careful distinctions, and depth of knowledge to this discussion. His analysis of the
impact of Daubert and Kumho Tire4 on the treatment of expert evidence
admissibility presented in one short note describing the impact of
Daubert and its progeny on the development of the law in the states is
particularly insightful.5 In the note, he briefly set out six different and
significant observations:6 (1) He recognized the complexity of the effects
of the Daubert case, noting that some states adopted Daubert, but not
the other two cases in the trilogy;7 (2) Paul observed that features of
Daubert have crept into the analysis in states that have continued to
use the Frye test;8 (3) he found that after Daubert was decided, Frye—
which had generally been limited to criminal cases—was extended to
civil torts cases; (4) he noted that Daubert’s greatest impact was on
states that formerly used the relevancy approach, although the impact
is often denied by the jurisdiction, claiming consistency in approach
before and after substantial changes; (5) he observed that while some
states adopted a Daubert-like system, having rejected Frye before
Daubert was decided, they use a decidedly different set of tests; (6)
finally, Paul questioned the significance of the jurisdiction’s choice between using a Daubert- or Frye-based approach to the admission of expert evidence. He described an existing difference in Frye states
between those that were strict and those that were lax in their scrutiny
of the admission of expert testimony. He observed that the most significant difference between the approaches in different jurisdictions is not
based on the choice between Daubert or Frye-based systems, but between strict or lax scrutiny.9
Elsewhere, Paul dealt with which system—Daubert or Frye—
provides “the better approach.” His response, based on the insight of
the Washington Supreme Court, is that the difficulties of applying Frye
in some contexts is often related to the complexity of the issue and that
truly complex and controversial evidence is going to be difficult under
either standard.10
He drew the distinction between the impact of Daubert in civil
cases, where evidence has been examined more closely and more evidence has been found unreliable, as contrasted to the treatment of
4.

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

5.

Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 650–51.

6.

Id.

7.

The trilogy includes Daubert, Kumho Tire, and General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

8.

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

9.

Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 650–51.

10.

Id. at 637.
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criminal cases where admissibility standards have remained largely
unchanged.11
Finally, he chose Judge Nancy Gertner’s decision in United States
v. Hines12 as one of the principal cases in the chapter.13 Among other
insights from this case is the appropriately different treatment of reliability for different issues that themselves differ in complexity. Judge
Gertner found the validity of handwriting analysis insufficiently established to allow the expert to give an opinion that the defendant was the
writer of the “stickup” note in a robbery case, but adequately validated
to provide guidance to the jury in reaching its own decision as to
whether the defendant was the author of that note. Paul clearly recognized that Judge Gertner’s limitation on giving an opinion of authorship
did not represent the majority position in the federal courts.14 Nevertheless, the insight that when an expert exercises a teaching function,
providing information to jurors to aid their evaluation of the evidence,
as authorized by the “or otherwise” language in Rule 702,15 validity
under Daubert must be shown, but the extent of the validity showing
is not necessarily as extensive.16
All of these insights are, in our judgment, both cogent and well
framed. Paul compressed an extraordinary quantity of information and
insights into a very compact space and presented it in a coherent way
that was very accessible to teachers and students alike.
As evidence teachers who live in North Carolina and each have an
evidence treatise for practitioners in the state,17 we found these points
particularly insightful as our state courts wrestled with the impact of
the Daubert decision on North Carolina’s treatment of expert testimony. We believe that the development of the law regarding expert
testimony dealing with the reliability of expert testimony in our state
strongly supports and illustrates the points Paul makes in our casebook.
The importance of the state court’s analysis depends more upon
11.

Id. at 648–49.

12.

55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).

13.

Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 651–58.

14.

Id. at 658.

15.

See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.

16.

See D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy
of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 508, 533–
37 (2000) (arguing for different threshold standards for different kinds of
expert evidence).

17.

Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence
(7th ed. 2017); Robert P. Mosteller et al., North Carolina
Evidentiary Foundations (3d ed. 2016).
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whether the court takes a strict or a lax approach to the analysis of
expert testimony than whether the state labels itself a Daubert, Frye,
or something-else jurisdiction.
North Carolina Was a Pre-Daubert Reliability State with a Very
Different Set of Tests

Beginning in 1984 with its decision in State v. Bullard18 and
continuing the development with State v. Pennington19 in 1990, North
Carolina rejected exclusive adherence to Frye. It also developed its own
separate reliability test for admissibility of expert testimony as Daubert
later did in the federal courts.20
A Period of Uncertainty Whether North Carolina Became a “Daubert
State” Through Judicial Analysis

Whether North Carolina had in fact become a “Daubert state”
became a matter of uncertainty and debate in 1995 when State v.
Goode,21 cited Daubert with apparent approval.22 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals read this citation to mean that North Carolina had
18.

322 S.E.2d 370, 381–82 nn.14–15 (N.C. 1984).

19.

393 S.E.2d 847, 852–53 (N.C. 1990).

20.

In State v. Pennington, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
A new scientific method of proof is admissible at trial if the method
is sufficiently reliable. Reliability of a scientific procedure is usually
established by expert testimony, and the acceptance of experts
within the field is one index, though not the exclusive index, of
reliability. Thus we do not adhere exclusively to the formula,
enunciated in Frye v. United States, and followed in many
jurisdictions, that the method of proof “must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs.” Believing that the inquiry underlying the Frye
formula is one of the reliability of the scientific method rather than
its popularity within a scientific community, we have focused on the
following indices of reliability: the expert’s use of established
techniques, the expert’s professional background in the field, the use
of visual aids before the jury so that the jury is not asked “to sacrifice
its independence by accepting [the] scientific hypotheses on faith,”
and independent research conducted by the expert.
Id. (citations omitted).

21.

461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995).

22.

Id. at 639. The court stated “[a]s recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in its most recent opinion addressing the admissibility of expert
scientific testimony, this requires a preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is sufficiently valid and
whether that reasoning or methodology can be properly applied to the facts
in issue.” Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993)).
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in some form adopted Daubert as its test,23 and it applied the Daubert
analysis in Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd.24
A Clear Rejection of Adoption of Daubert as the Method for Judging
Expert Admissibility by the North Carolina Supreme Court and a Choice
of “Lax” Application

In its opinion reversing the lower court’s Howerton decision, the
North Carolina Supreme Court left no room for uncertainty. It clearly
rejected the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, stating that “North Carolina
is not, nor has it ever been, a Daubert jurisdiction.”25
Paul has noted that a critical distinction between jurisdictions that
is generally more significant than whether the Frye test or the Daubert
test was employed was whether the jurisdiction was strict or lax in its
application of the test. The North Carolina Supreme Court judged the
dominant Daubert test to be too strict and clearly chose the merits of
scrutiny that was more flexible. The court used the quoted language
below to describe its negative view of what it saw as an overly rigid
and excessively exacting Daubert system and its negative impact on the
right to a jury trial in contrast to what it perceived to be a more flexible
North Carolina reliability-based system.
While North Carolina cases “share obvious similarities with the
principles underlying Daubert, application of the North Carolina approach is decidedly less mechanistic and rigorous than the ‘exacting
standards of reliability’ demanded by the federal approach.”26 The court
stated:
We believe that in practice, however, application of the “flexible”
Daubert standard has been anything but liberal or relaxed and
that trial courts, such as the one in the present case, have often
been reluctant to stray far from the original Daubert factors in
their analysis of the reliability of expert testimony. . . . As a
consequence of these stringent threshold standards for admitting
expert testimony, we are concerned with the case-dispositive
nature of Daubert proceedings, whereby parties in civil actions
may use pre-trial motions to exclude expert testimony under

23.

State v. Bates, 538 S.E.2d 597, 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that Goode
had adopted Daubert).

24.

581 S.E.2d 816, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (“From a thorough review of our
case law, it is eminently clear that North Carolina has adopted the Daubert
analysis.”).

25.

Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (N.C. 2004).

26.

Id. at 690 (citing Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000)).
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Daubert to bootstrap motions for summary judgment that
otherwise would not likely succeed.27

When evidence is excluded in pre-trial hearings, the court stated
“we are concerned that trial courts asserting sweeping pre-trial ‘gatekeeping’ authority under Daubert may unnecessarily encroach upon the
constitutionally-mandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact
and to assess the weight of the evidence.”28 And in summary, the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated:
Although our criticism of Daubert is largely anecdotal and by no
means exhaustive, given the serious implications of these
concerns, we believe that on balance the North Carolina law
which has coalesced in Goode establishes a more workable
framework for ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony
under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702. Long before Daubert
was decided, North Carolina had in place a flexible system of
assessing the foundational reliability of expert testimony, the
practicability of which is evidenced by the case law. Within this
system, our trial courts are already vested with broad discretion
to limit the admissibility of expert testimony as necessitated by
the demands of each case. Requiring a more complicated and
demanding rule of law is unnecessary to assist North Carolina
trial courts in a procedure which we do not perceive as in need of
repair. We therefore expressly reject the federal Daubert standard
upon which both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erroneously based their respective rulings.29
Adoption of Daubert Analysis for North Carolina by Legislative Action

In 2011, as part of a group of “Tort Reform” changes in the law,
the North Carolina legislature amended North Carolina Rule 702(a) to
follow the wording of Federal Rule 702 after it was amended in 2000.30
Previously this part of the North Carolina statute had tracked the
wording of the original version of Federal Rule 702, with one exception.
Federal Rule 702 provided that the witness may testify in the form of
an opinion “or otherwise.” The North Carolina rule as initially

27.

Id. at 691.

28.

Id. at 692 (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 25; Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm., 160 F.
Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 131
(Ariz. 2000); Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 472 (Wyo. 1999)).

29.

Id. at 692–93.

30.

An Act to Provide Tort Reform for North Carolina Citizens and Businesses,
H.B. 542, 2011 Gen. Assemb. § 1.3 (N.C. 2011).
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promulgated eliminated “or otherwise.”31 Because the change in the
state’s rule was made effective only prospectively,32 it was not until
2016 that the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the effect of
the amendment. It did so in State v. McGrady,33 a criminal case in
which the testimony of a use-of-force expert offered by the defense had
been excluded on the basis of Daubert analysis.34
In McGrady, the North Carolina Supreme Court explained the
changes resulting from the 2011 amendment. Reversing the court’s
statement in Howerton, it declared that “North Carolina is now a
Daubert state.”35
In our casebook, Paul noted differences in the rigor in which the
Daubert standards have been applied among states that have “adopted”
Daubert.36 In McGrady, the court attempted to set out how the federal
rule, advisory committee commentary, and case law was to be applied
in North Carolina. The federal rule codified the full breath of the
Daubert standard.37 “By adopting virtually the same language from the
federal rule into the North Carolina rule, the General Assembly thus
adopted the meaning of the federal rule as well.”38 The adopted
“Daubert standard” also includes existing North Carolina precedents,
as long as those precedents do not conflict with the amended rule’s text
or those three United States Supreme Court decisions, but would not
include subsequent federal developments.39
The Major Change: The New Standard Is More Rigorous

While the 2011 amendment did not change the basic structure of
the inquiry under the previous North Carolina rule or displace relevant
tests of reliability under Howerton, the amendment had a significant
impact on the “lax” standards for admission of expert evidence. It
changed “the level of rigor that [North Carolina] courts must use to
31.

See Mosteller et al., supra note 17, at app. 1 at art. 7 (setting out official
commentary by the drafters to the original North Carolina rule).

32.

H.B. 542, § 4.2 (making the provisions of the amended evidence rule effective
to actions commenced after October 1, 2011).

33.

787 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2016).

34.

Id. at 5.

35.

Id. at 8.

36.

Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 651.

37.

McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 6.

38.

Id. at 7–8.

39.

Id. at 8. The court also endorsed the additional tests for admissibility of
expert testimony provided in the advisory committee note to the 2000
amendment of Federal Rule 702. Id. at 10.
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scrutinize expert testimony before admitting it.”40 Whereas Howerton
was “decidedly less . . . rigorous” than Daubert,41 the federal standard
established, in the words of Weisgram v. Marley,42 “exacting standards
of reliability.”43
The Exclusion of the Expert Testimony in the McGrady Case Itself

Charles McGrady was charged with the first-degree murder of his
cousin and neighbor James Shore. McGrady claimed that the killing
was in self-defense. According to McGrady’s testimony, following a verbal altercation, Shore grabbed an AR-15 assault rifle from the golf cart
in which McGrady and his son were riding and pointed it at McGrady’s
son’s head.44 McGrady pulled a Beretta pistol from his pocket, and, in
1.82 seconds45 fired seven times at Shore. He hit Shore “four or five
times in the front and side and twice in the back.”46 The shots to the
back were obviously problematic for McGrady’s self-defense claim, particularly since one of those shots to the back was the fatal shot that
went through Shore’s lung and into his heart.47
The testimony excluded in McGrady was that of Dave F. Cloutier,
a use-of-force expert who the defense proposed to call as a witness. This
expert sought to testify about average reaction times for study subjects
to turn their bodies—turning 90 degrees in an average of 0.31 seconds
and turning 180 degrees in an average time of 0.676 seconds.48 He also
reported an average of 0.365 seconds for study subjects to shoot with
their finger already on the trigger and 0.677 seconds with the finger
outside the trigger guard.49 Cloutier cited a single study for the specific

40.

Id.

41.

Id. (quoting Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (N.C. 2004).

42.

528 U.S. 440 (2000).

43.

McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 7 (quoting Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455).

44.

Id. at 4–5.

45.

Id. at 13. McGrady recorded the audio of the incident on a tape recorder, id.
at 4, which is the apparent source of the precise timing of the seven shots.

46.

Id. at 5. The uncertainty in the number of shots that hit Shore resulted from
the fact that some of the bullets entered the decedent’s arm and then
reentered his torso, making it difficult to calculate an exact number of shots.
State v. McGrady, 753 S.E.2d 361, 364 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).

47.

McGrady, 753 S.E.2d at 364.

48.

Defendant’s Expert Report of Dave F. Cloutier at 13, State v. McGrady, 787
S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2014) (Nos. 11CRS54425, COA13-330) [hereinafter Cloutier
Report].

49.

Id.; see also McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 13.
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average times given.50 However, the testimony had two distinct parts.
The first, which described the average time it took subjects to do a
physical act—turn their bodies—that would have application to the
victim, Shore. The second, which deals with the firing of the gun—a
course of action that also includes perception, thinking, and action—
that would have application to the defendant, McGrady.
Many of the studies cited by Cloutier involved police officers with
special training as the subjects of the study, but one regarding the speed
with which individuals can turn their bodies instead involved college
students, most without firearms training.51 It reported similar average
times to those given above.52 With regard to the actions that require
perception, thought, and reaction, he cited a Federal Aviation
Administration study of midair collision avoidance.53
The trial court found Cloutier’s testimony to be unreliable. The
principal reason it cited—and the reason that the North Carolina
Supreme Court approved—for exclusion of the testimony was that the
defense expert had not provided the court with known or potential error
rates for the studies on the reaction times that he used.54 Another
ground cited was that the expert had not considered variables in his
testimony that the expert acknowledged could have affected the
50.

Ernest J. Tobin & Martin L. Fackler, MD, Officer Reaction-Response Times
in Firing a Handgun, 3 J. Int’l Wound Ballistics Ass’n 6 (1997); see
also Voir Dire Transcript of Dave Cloutier at 1148–49, State v. McGrady,
787 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2014) (Nos. 11CRS54425, COA13-330) [hereinafter Voir
Dire Transcript]. Although this study was clearly given as the source of this
data and a number of other studies were cited in Cloutier’s report, see
Cloutier Report, supra note 48, at 11–13, the Supreme Court erroneously
referred to only two studies—one by the Federal Aviation Administration
and another done with college students, which the expert’s report indicated
was written by William J. Lewinski. See McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 14.

51.

Cloutier Report, supra note 48, at 12–13.

52.

That report is by Bill Lewinski, Ph.D., Why is the Suspect Shot in the Back?,
Police Marksman, Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 20, 25–27; Cloutier Report, supra
note 48, at 13 n.30.

53.

Civil Aeromedical Inst.–Physiological Operations, Fed. Aviation
Admin., Physiological Training-High Speed Flight 24 (1972); see
Cloutier Report, supra note 48, at 11–12 n.27; Voir Dire Transcript, supra
note 50, at 1147–48, 1159 (describing a Los Angeles Police Department study
regarding braking times to stop a vehicle once a danger was perceived).

54.

See McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 14. The trial judge also cited the issue of peer
review. During the trial judge’s questioning of Cloutier, he asked, “[d]id any
doctor peer review your opinion in this case?” and received a negative answer
from Cloutier. Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 50, at 1167. In ruling against
admitting the expert testimony, the trial court began by stating that “Mr.
Cloutier has not been the subject of peer review; at least nothing was brought
forward to suggest that it has been.” Id. at 1189.
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reactions times. The omitted variable was the defendant’s back injury
and recognized physical disability.55
Did the Court Get the Narrow Issue of the Inadequacy of the Expert’s
Testimony Wrong?

While there may well have been substantial reasons to question
other parts of the testimony that Cloutier would have provided, we
have serious concerns about the correctness of the rationale and ruling
excluding one part of it—the average times of study participants to
turn their bodies and average times for other study participants to fire
a weapon. It is not at all clear—particularly as applied to the average
speed with which the study participants turned their bodies—that the
judge’s decision to exclude was correct because the defense expert failed
to provide the court with known or potential error rates for the relevant
studies. The secondary ground of failure to take into account the defendant’s back injury and disability was closer to being correct, but
likely also failed. As to error rate and average turning times, the criticism simply does not fit the type of test results involved. “The typical
use of the term ‘error rate’ refers to the number of ‘mistakes’ a particular technique or method will make in some specific number of trials.”56
This testimony was not predicting a particular result, but rather reporting average results from observations of human capacity or
performance.
Moreover, the testimony about the studies was not part of an opinion by the expert of what happened in the case, but rather was for the
purpose of helping the jury assess the plausibility of McGrady’s
testimony that the shots he fired while fearing for his and his son’s life
as Shore threatened them could have entered Shore’s back as he turned
away. During defense counsel’s redirect of the expert, he clarified that
Cloutier would not be offering an opinion as to the specific time it took
McGrady to react or Shore to react or turn around.57 The testimony regarding the studies was not predicting results but rather was showing
human capacity to turn the body quickly and thereby giving the jurors
information to assist them in judging McGrady’s testimony. The judge
apparently missed that this was the type of limited use of expertise that
Judge Gertner approved in United States v. Hines. Such testimony was
useful to the jury in evaluating handwriting and valid for that limited
use, even though it was not valid if the expert were to go an additional
55.

See McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 14 (noting the trial court’s reliance on the
expert’s failure to consider these conditions and stating that the defendant
“had a back injury and a disability rating from the military”).

56.

1 David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law
and Science of Expert Testimony §1:21, at 77 (2015–2016 ed.).

57.

Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 50, at 1173.
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step and render an opinion regarding the defendant’s authorship of the
“stickup” note.58 Moreover, as Judge Gertner observed, such testimony
is particularly useful where it informs jurors of information that conflicts with their prior common understanding.59
The trial judge came much closer to a valid ground for excluding
the average-turning-time evidence in his secondary argument that the
expert failed to explain the impact of the defendant’s physical disability
and his back injury on the time it might have taken him to turn his
body. The failure to consider an important variable on performance is
a deficiency that undercuts the reliability of the evidence in a fashion
similar to poor results where error rates are appropriate measures of
validity. Professors John Meixner and Shari Diamond argue that error
rate analysis plays a bigger role, particularly in exclusion of expert testimony, than scholars looking at results have generally noted.60 They
argue that explicit numerical error rates are often not available or
appropriate, and as result, an error rate as an explicit test for admissibility appears infrequently in decided cases.61
Professors Meixner and Diamond contend that the concept of error
rate should be more broadly conceived. They believe it should include,
not only “the more explicit ‘known’ error, which can be evaluated simply by assessing a numerical value,” but also “the more implicit ‘potential’ error, which can be assessed by examining the methodology and
evaluating its potential for producing erroneous results.”62 “An implicit
error rate analysis might be characterized as an analysis in which the
judge is attempting to discern the likely accuracy of the expert even if
an error rate has not been explicitly provided.”63 They note that an expert not taking account of a critical feature of the case that differs from
the study circumstances, similar to the defendant’s back injury and disability, should be a basis for exclusion under this category of “implicit
error rate.”64
58.

See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.

59.

See Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 657.

60.

See John B. Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Hidden Daubert
Factor: How Judges Use Error Rates in Assessing Scientific Evidence, 2014
Wis. L. Rev. 1063, 1063 (2014).

61.

The trial judge asked, “[d]id any of the studies you have cited account for
an error rate for someone that has had a back injury in the past?” Voir Dire
Transcript, supra note 50, at 1166.

62.

Meixner & Diamond, supra note 60, at 1071.

63.

Id. at 1089.

64.

Id. at 1065–67 (describing a products liability case in which the expert’s
observation was after a change in the condition of the vehicle from its
condition at the time of the accident, which the authors contend should be
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Cloutier’s suggested explanation that the effect of adrenalin would
likely overcome the impact of a back injury or disability was insufficient.65 However, while still a technically valid criticism, the failure to
take into account the potential effect of a disability and a back injury
on turning times is not significant when applied to the defendant. For
the evidence to be helpful to the defendant, his reaction time in shooting
needs to be slow in comparison to the victim’s turning time. It is hard
to imagine a situation where taking into account the defendant’s physical limitations would speed up his reaction time. Rather it would likely
have slowed his reaction time. Evidence is not excluded because it could
have been more helpful to the party offering it if other factors were considered. Indeed, the prosecutor’s first line of attack on this issue was
Cloutier’s failure to take into account the fact that the victim had had
a broken back and Cloutier’s failure to get access to the victim’s medical
records so he could consider this injury.66 Had that failure been a ground
for exclusion, the argument would have been much more powerful since
the injury could well have slowed down the victim’s turning time, which
would have undercut the expert’s testimony. However, the trial judge
ignored the prosecutor’s line of questioning and argument and focused
only on the defendant’s condition in his questioning of Cloutier and in
his ruling excluding the testimony.67
Another possible basis for exclusion was the failure of the expert to
respond to the trial judge’s question regarding error rates for reaction
times. The expert was not prepared to answer and responded that he
did not know. However, there were valid responses that he could have
given.68 There are some weaknesses in aspects of the research Cloutier
excluded because of likely error based on improper methodology and which
they label “implicit error rate analysis”).
65.

See State v. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d 1, 14 (N.C. 2016).

66.

Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 50, at 1163–65. In arguing for exclusion of
Cloutier’s testimony, the prosecutor asserted that evidence had been
presented that the victim had a broken back. Id. at 1175–76.

67.

Id. at 1165–67, 1190.

68.

Cf. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d at 14 (“A trial judge could reasonably conclude
that Mr. Cloutier’s degree of unfamiliarity with these studies rendered his
testimony about them, the conclusions about this particular case that he
drew from them, unreliable.”). The trial judge had an excessively broad view
of the usefulness of error rates to determine reliability under Daubert. He
asked the same error rate questions, not only about reaction times, but also
to the use of force variables, perception of pre-attack cues, perception
narrowing, and the effects of the “fight or flight” phenomenon. See Voir Dire
Transcript, supra note 50, at 1170–71. Cloutier’s response to every error rate
question, including that of reaction time, was basically the same—that he
did not know. Id. For the Lewinski study of college students used by
Cloutier, which reported average turning times and quickest turning times
for the twenty-five test subjects over five repetitions of each turning
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utilized but not likely substantial enough to warrant exclusion of the
reaction time testimony. While the McGrady case was pending in the
North Carolina Supreme Court, the New York Times published an
article describing exactly the type of testimony McGrady offered. But,
the article discussed evidence presented on behalf of police officers accused in criminal and civil cases of unjustified shooting of suspects,
often fleeing and sometimes shot in the back.69 The article describes the
testimony of psychology professor William J. Lewinski in defense of the
officers.70 Lewinski has enjoyed considerable success and notoriety.
In McGrady, Cloutier relied on two of Lewinski’s articles.71 In terms
of Daubert factors, Lewinski’s research was not published in peer
reviewed journals, but instead in a trade publication popular with the
police.72 It also has an element of professional bias behind it, in that it
grows out of research tied up in litigation that the expert benefits from,
rather than research conducted independently from litigation.73
Variants of these two criticisms also apply to the article by Tobin and
Fackler, upon which Cloutier’s specific reaction times are based.74

procedure, the primary response should have been, as noted above, that error
rate is inappropriate for reporting average performance times. As to the
accuracy of the data reported, Lewinski described the mechanical recording
and timing instruments used and stated that the “error factor in the timing
is plus or minus 03/100ths of a second.” See Lewinski, supra note 52, at 20.
Similarly, the Tobin and Fackler article provides information on the degree
of precision of the timing technology, and for the turning times of the study
participants, it reports the mean, range, and standard deviation, but nothing
about error rate. See Tobin & Fackler, supra note 50, at 7.
69.

See Matt Apuzzo, Training Officers to Shoot First, and He Will Answer
Questions Later, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/02/us/training-officers-to-shoot-first-and-he-will-answer-questionslater.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/G658-PQFA].

70.

Id.

71.

Voir Dire Transcript, supra note 50, at 1140–41, 1161.

72.

Apuzzo, supra note 69 (noting three Lewinski articles, all of which were
published in The Police Marksman, “a popular magazine for [police]
officers”).

73.

See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment
(describing the first of five additional tests set out in the note).

74.

This Journal of the International Wound Ballistics Association
article is similarly published in a trade magazine related to law
enforcement—Public Agency Training Council. See Tobin & Fackler,
supra note 50. Like Lewinski, Tobin and Fackler have gained notoriety as
experts whose work benefits charged police officers. See Shot in the Back,
Now What?, Pub. Agency Training Council, http://www.patc.com/
special/shotinback.shtml [https://perma.cc/A5VV-WDRW] (last visited
Feb. 11, 2018) (listing Tobin and Fackler along with Lewinski as doing
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Finally, as to reaction times—particularly the speed with which study
participants could turn their bodies, where the evidence was on the
most solid ground—there may be an argument that exclusion was
harmless on the facts of this case. McGrady fired seven rounds over a
period of 1.82 seconds, with two of those rounds entering Shore’s back.75
Without expert testimony, the jury could have understood that Shore
would have been able to do substantial turning during those 1.82 seconds. How information on quickness of turning times would have aided
the jury in evaluating the self-defense issue is arguably less clear, and,
therefore, exclusion is arguably less significant under these facts than
in other scenarios involving shorter time periods and fewer shots.
It appears that the trial judge and the North Carolina Supreme
Court misapplied the error rate argument from Daubert in the McGrady
case. That may be considered a somewhat technical error, but the
change in the law as interpreted by the court requires rigorous scrutiny
of reliability. When the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the
enactment of amended Rule 702 meant a rigorous enforcement of
Daubert admissibility rules, it presumably should have embraced with
this enhanced rigor a companion responsibility of judicial accuracy in
application of reliability concepts. Exclusion based on a rote and misapplied incantation of error rates or peer review,76 particularly when
rigorously enforced, should not be the new way that the reliability of
expert testimony is judged in North Carolina.
These courts also made an additional legal error in failing to
recognize that the expert in this instance was undertaking a different
and more limited task of educating the jurors rather than giving an
opinion about an outcome, and the education was for the purpose of
correcting a likely societal misconception. The Supreme Court gave no
attention to this different purpose and, perhaps more remarkably, did
not note that the legislative amendment that brought Daubert analysis
to North Carolina for the first time explicitly authorized expert
testimony to instruct the jurors on relevant concepts to assist them in
evaluating evidence. The 2011 amendment enacted by the North
Carolina legislature—which incorporated the language of the 2000
federal amendment to Rule 702 that “codified” the expert testimony
evaluation system of Daubert and its progeny—also added the words
“or otherwise” to the rule in the language that authorized a qualified
expert to “testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise . . . .”77
ground breaking research helpful to officers charged in connection with
shootings).
75.

See State v. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. 2016).

76.

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

77.

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8c-702 (West 2017).
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As noted above, North Carolina Evidence Rule 702(a) on expert testimony, as originally enacted, differed from the Federal Rule 702 only in
omitting the words “or otherwise” from the language of the federal
rule.78
The meaning of the omitted “or otherwise” language in the federal
rule is explained by one paragraph of the advisory committee note to
the original Federal Rule 702.79 The explanation relates to the effort to
eliminate the need to use a hypothetical question to elicit an expert
opinion. One of the ways to eliminate the need to ask the question was
not to elicit an opinion. Instead the expert “may give a dissertation or
exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving
the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.”80 The Commentary to the
original North Carolina Rule 702 provided no explanation for which the
words were omitted, stating only the result. “This rule is identical to
Fed. R. Evid. 702, except that the words ‘or otherwise’ which appear
at the end of the federal rule after the word ‘opinion’ have been
omitted.”81

78.

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

79.

The committee’s note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form
of opinions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule
accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a
dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to
the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Since
much of the criticism of expert testimony has centered upon the
hypothetical question, it seems wise to recognize that opinions are
not indispensable and to encourage the use of expert testimony in
non-opinion form when counsel believes the trier can itself draw the
requisite inference. The use of opinions is not abolished by the rule,
however. It will continue to be permissible for the experts to take
the further step of suggesting the inference which should be drawn
from applying the specialized knowledge to the facts. See Rules 703
to 705.
Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (2012).

80.

Id.

81.

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8c-702 (West 2017). North Carolina Rule 705
differs from Federal Rule 705 in adding a final sentence that states: “There
shall be no requirement that expert testimony be in response to a
hypothetical question.” Compare id., with Fed. R. Evid. 705. Perhaps
having eliminated the need to ask a hypothetical question through another
provision, the invitation to this alternative type of expert testimony, which
was in part at least designed to reduce the need for hypothetical questions,
was seen as unnecessary.
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The North Carolina experience with Daubert shows the sophistication and accuracy of Paul’s analysis of how Daubert interacted with
state evidence practice. However, one of his observations does not seem
to fit. He stated that the new analysis did not have very much impact
changing admissibility practices in criminal cases.82 McGrady would
appear to be an exception. However, perhaps at least a partial explanation is that the evidence was offered by the defense and was not part
of the class of historically accepted forensic evidence used by the prosecution and apparently little affected by Daubert despite the weakness
of some types of that evidence. It will be interesting to see how Paul
would treat this issue in the future if the McGrady case were to find its
way into that note with a “but see” or “but cf.” citation and its explanatory parenthetical.

II. Paul Giannelli—Wonderful Co-Author and
Colleague
Paul has been an absolute delight to work with as a co-author. His
work is, as described above, masterfully crafted. He was always willing
to take on a different assignment than was his initial preference if
needed to complete the project. His work was always completed well in
advance of deadlines. Those aspects of responsibility went without
saying.
Paul gave outstanding advice in improving the work in a number
of ways overall. For example, when he first joined the book, he
suggested that we provide descriptive headings globally for all our notes
that followed the cases. It took only a couple minutes after the reaction
“oh no, not more work” wore off for us to recognize that this was
obviously an important improvement.
Beyond all his other outstanding attributes, Paul is a warm and
giving person. He has a wonderful sense of humor. His presence on our
project, and we must assume in many others, made it far more enjoyable than it would have been without him as our co-author, colleague,
and friend.
We wish Paul all the best in his retirement.

82.

See Broun, Mosteller & Giannelli, supra note 1, at 648–49.
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